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INTRODUCTION
The most profound contribution of Konrad Schiemann to
the European Union may well have been his Mackenzie Stuart
Lecture at the University of Cambridge on February 9, 2012.'
Having been born in Germany of German parents but brought
up and educated in England, followed by a long and
distinguished career as barrister, Queen's Counsel and judge, he
set out the case for the EU as a source of inspiration-what one
might call the moral case for Europe. His lecture deserves to be
read and valued by the students of the current generation for
whom the experiences of our generation are as remote as were
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 or the Bulgarian atrocities
of 1876 for us.
As my contribution to this set of essays in honour of Konrad
Schiemann, I would like to address a more limited topic which
has its own moral dimension. This is the problem that would
* Professor Emeritus of the University of Edinburgh; Judge of the Court of First
Instance, 1980-02, and of the Court ofJustice, 1992-2004.
1. Sir Konrad Schiemann, European Court of justice, Mackenzie Stewart Lecture:
The EU as a Source of Inspiration, (Feb. 9 2012),
http://wwv.cels.1aw.cam.ac.uk/mackenzie stuart lectures/2012 mackenzie stuart Iec
ture.php.
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arise if one constituent part of a Member State were to decide to
separate from the rest of that State. The problem arises today-
at least potentially-in the cases of Scotland, Catalonia and
Flanders vis-i-vis, respectively, the remainder of the United
Kingdom, Spain and Belgium.
The moral dimension has been accentuated very recently
by a contribution of Professor Joseph Weiler as editor of the
Europeanjournal ofInternational Law on the subject of Catalonian
independence2 According to Professor Weiler, "It is simply
ethically demoralizing to see the likes of Catalonia reverting to
an early 20th-century post-World War I mentality, when the
notion that a single state could encompass more than one
nationality seemed impossible . . . ." The Catalan claims of
historic wrongs in the Franco era are "but a fig leaf for seriously
misdirected social and economic egoism, cultural and national
hubris and the naked ambition of local politicians."4 He
concludes:
Europe should not seem like a Nirvana for that form of
irredentist Euro-tribalism which contradicts the deep values
and needs of the Union. The assumption of automatic
membership in the Union should be decisively squelched by
the countries from whom secession is threatened and if
their leaders, for internal political reasons, lack the courage
so to say, by other Member States of the Union, France in
the lead.
As regards the legal position, the President of the European
Commission, Jos6 Manuel Barroso, in a letter to the Chairman
of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee of the
United Kingdom Parliament, has stated:
The EU is founded on the Treaties which apply only to
the Member States who have agreed and ratified them. If
part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be
part of that state because it were to become a new
independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to
2. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Slouching Towards The Cool War; Catalonian Independence
and the European Union; Roll Of Honour; in this Issue; A Personal Statement 23 EUR.J. INT'L
1.909 (2012).
3. Id. at 910.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 911.
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that territory. In other words, a new independent state
would, by the fact of its independence, become a third
country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no
longer apply on its territory.
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any
European state which respects the principles set out in
Ai ticle 2 of the Treaty on European Union may apply to
become a member of the EU. If the application is accepted
by the Council acting unanimously, an agreement is then
negotiated between the applicant state and the Member
States on the conditions of admission and the adjustments
to the Treaties which such admission entails. This
agreement is subject to ratification by all Member States and
the applicant state.6
The purpose of this essay is to examine the legal
correctness of Mr. Barroso's statement (the Barroso theory'),
and statements to the opposite effect. But I should first make my
own position clear, since I am a Scot living in Scotland, and I will
be one of those that will be asked next year (2014) to vote in a
referendum on the issue of Scottish independence. The issue of
Scotland's future within the EU is one that has profound
implications for that debate.
I am personally a moderate unionist in the sense that I still
believe in the United Kingdom but I respect the sincerely held
views of moderate separatists, like the late Professor Sir Neil
MacCormick, who believe in Scottish independence. I hope very
much that the issue of an independent Scotland's place in the
EU will not arise, but the issue is still important and concerns
other countries as well.
It may be, as Professor Weiler suggests, that the issue should
not arise, and that the pretensions of separatists in Scotland,
Catalonia and Flanders should be dismissed as irredentist Euro-
tribalism. The fact remains that a more than insignificant
proportion of the people in those areas supports them. Article 2
of the Treaty on European Union ('TEU') affirms the belief that
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for human dignity, freedom and democracy.7 If the majority
were to vote for independence, it is difficult to see why those
core values should not be respected.
In any event, I can see nothing ignoble or tribalist in the
belief that small countries are likely to be more in tune with the
aspirations of their citizens than large ones. That, after all, is an
aspect of subsidiaritv, one of the Union's core principles set out
in Article 5 TEU.8 And it is not obvious to me why the EU should
hold its doors open to the small nations of Middle and Eastern
Europe whose very existence as independent states is due to the
break-up of greater entities, while slamming them shut against
the aspirations of those who regard themselves as 'stateless
nations' in Western Europe.
In short, the moral arguments are ambivalent and it seems
to me to be more fruitful to focus on the legal issues. Before
doing so, however, it is necessary to highlight important
differences between the three cases of Scotland, Flanders and
Catalonia. In each case, there are complex and mutually
incompatible arguments at the national level.
I. SCOTLAND
In the case of Scotland, the Government and the
Parliament of the United Kingdom have accepted (not without
opposition) that the devolved Government and Parliament of
Scotland may call a referendum in 2014 on the issue of Scottish
independence and that the result of that referendum will be
'definitive'-that is to say, that the United Kingdom as a whole
will accept that, in the event of an affirmative vote, Scotland
should become an independent State, separate from the rest of
the United Kingdom ('RoUK'). The necessary legislation to give
effect to the separation would be passed by the United Kingdom
Parliament in the same manner as, in 1707, the Parliaments of
7. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, 2010 0.J. C
83/17 [hereinafter TEU].
8. See id. art. 5(3); David Edward, Subsidiarity as a Legal Concept, in
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THL EU JUDICIAL SYSTLM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PLRTN1LLA
ILINDH 93, 93-103 (Pascal Cardonnel et al. eds., 2012).
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England and Scotland passed Acts to give effect to the Treaty (or
Articles) of Union between the two countries. 9
On this approach, the separation of Scotland from RoUK
would be recognised as having been brought about by
constitutional means and would therefore be entitled to
international recognition. Lawyers and politicians differ,
however, as to the effect in international law. The government
of the United Kingdom, supported by public international
lawyers, contend that RoUK would be the 'successor' or
'continuator. State, and that Scotland would be a 'new' State,
which would inherit neither the rights nor the obligations of the
former State from which it had seceded.10
There is statistical support for the view that RoUK would be
the successor State. The land area of Scotland as compared with
RoUK is about 78,400 as against 165,000 square kilometers
(about 50%), while the population is about 5.25 million as
against 57.87 million (about 10%). There is thus a considerable
difference in population, though less in terms of land area. The
centre of government for the United Kingdom is in London
which is also the capital of England.
There are dissentient voices, particularly amongst Scottish
historians and constitutionalists. They contend that the United
Kingdom is, by its very name and nature, the union of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. Great Britain is the entity created
in 1603 by the union of the crowns of England (and Wales) and
Scotland and fortified by the Union of the Parliaments in 1707.
Article 1 of the Treaty of Union (1706) provided:
"That the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England shall
upon the 1st May next ensuing the date hereof, and forever
after, be United into One Kingdom by the name of GREAT
BRITAIN.""
Therefore, so the argument goes, the separation of
Scotland from England and Wales would dissolve the entity
known as Great Britain and thus dissolve the essence of the
9. Both Acts contain the text of the Treaty with some additional provisions. For
the full texts see http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1706/10/257 (Scottish) and
http:/,/vwT.rahbarnes.demon.co.uk/Union/UnionWithScotlandAct.htm (English).
10. Scotland Analysis : Devolution and the implications of Scottish Independence, Cm
8554, Ch. 2, Ltt://www.official-documLtents.gov.uk/documienL/cmi85/8534/8554.pdf.
11. See suqpr(. note 10.
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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
(Incidentally, the words "and forever after" have not been
invoked as excluding separation in the 21st century.)
According to this argument, a continuing union between
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (erroneously referred to
as RoUK) would be a 'new' State, as would Scotland. Neither
could claim to be the successor State, or perhaps both could do
so. The result would be akin to the situation that arose on the
dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia into two new States,
the Czech Republic and Slovakia (the so-called 'velvet divorce).
In that case, both States were recognised as successor States.
There is yet a further argument-that, even if separation
were to result in the existence of two States (in the sense
understood by international law), the "United Kingdom" would
not disappear because Scotland and RoUK would continue to
share the same monarch. (A comparable distinction between
monarchy and legislature was advanced by some of the
American colonists who wished to maintain the link with the
British Crown, but disputed the right of the British Parliament
to make laws for the self-governing colonies.)
Whichever of these views is correct, the question remains
whether public international law would determine the correct
approach under EU law to the issue of separation of an existing
Member State.
11. FLANDERS
Flanders is part of the Kingdom of Belgium which
separated from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830.
Belgium consists of three Regions: the Flemish (Dutch-
speaking) Region (Flanders); the Walloon (French-speaking)
Region (Wallonia); and the multilingual Brussels-Capital Region
where most of the EU institutions are based.' The German-
speaking communities round Eupen, Malmedy and Sankt Vith
were administered by Belgium after the First World War and
12. See Charles H. McIlwain in Pound, Mcllwain, Nichols, FLDERALISM AS A
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1942), page 34, and Jack P'. Greene, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMILRICAN RLVOLUTION (2011), page 91 ff.
13. Geographically, the Brussels-Capital Region is an 'island' within the territory
of the Flemish Region.
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became fully part of Belgium in 1925. They form part of the
Walloon Region but constitute a separate linguistic
Community.14
The Walloon Region has a larger land area than the
Flemish Region (11,500 as against 8,000 square kilometers), but
the Flemish has the larger population (about 6.25 as against 3.5
million). Brussels-Capital has a population of about 1 million,
and the German-speaking Community about 75,000.
Currently, the pressure for separation comes from the
people of Flanders, which is economically stronger, the people
of Wallonia being by and large content to remain in union with
Flanders (and, the Flemish would say, dependent on Flemish
subsidy). While it might be possible for Flanders to force
separation, Flanders could not be said to 'secede', since the two
entities are of roughly comparable size and population and
together form the Kingdom of Belgium. Neither Flanders nor
Wallonia has previously existed as a State or Kingdom separate
from the other.1
It would be natural for an outsider to assume that the
separation of Flanders and Wallonia would result in the
emergence of two new States and that the Kingdom of Belgium
would in consequence cease to exist. Some Flemish nationalists
argue, however, that this is not their aim, but rather to create a
Belgian Confederation of separate States under a single
monarch (similar to one version of the Scottish argument).
Whatever the outcome, it can probably be assumed that
separation would be achieved by constitutional means and
would consequently be entitled to international recognition.
14. Belgium is a federal State, with powers distributed between the Regions, the
linguistic Comnunities and the federation.
15. The Prince-Bishopric of Liagc was autonomous until it was annexed by
Napoleon. The Belgian Province of Luxembourg was part of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, of which the King of the Netherlands was Grand Duke, until 1839, when
the primarily French-speaking parts were annexed to Belgium under tie Treaty of
London 1839.
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111. CATALONIA6
Having been ruled as an autonomous entity by the Counts
of Barcelona, Catalonia became a principality of the Kingdom of
Aragon in 1137, which in turn united with the Kingdom of
Castile to form the Kingdom of Spain. It enjoyed its own laws,
taxes and privileges until they were removed after the War of the
Spanish Succession in the eighteenth century. With the Basque
Country and Galicia, Catalonia lost such autonomy as remained
at the end of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. It has now
become an Autonomous Community of the Kingdom of Spain.
Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides: "The
Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish
nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards;
it recognises and guarantees the right to self-government of the
nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the
solidarity amongst them all."17
Catalonia is one of the 'nationalities' so recognised. The
Preamble of its Statute of Autonomy of 2006, like the previous
Statute of 1979, was drawn up by the Parliament of Catalonia,
approved and sanctioned by the Parliament of Spain and
ratified by a referendum in Catalonia. The Preamble states that
"Reflect[ing] the feelings and the wishes of the citizens of
Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has defined Catalonia as
a nation by an ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, in its
second Article, recognises the national reality of Catalonia as a
nationality." 8
The constitutionality of the statement that Catalonia is a
'nation' was contested before the Spanish Constitutional Court
(Tribunal Constitucional). In its judgment of 28 June 2010, the
Court held that:
It is indeed possible to speak of nation as a cultural,
historic. linguistic, sociological and even religious reality.
But the nation of importance here is solely and exclusively
the nation in its legal and constitutional sense. And in that
specific sense, the Constitution does not recognize anything
16. I am gratelul to Professor Miquel Strubell i Trueta of the Universitat Oberta
de Catalunya for help with this section.
17. C.E., B.O.E. art. 2. Dec. 27. 1978 (Spain).
18. Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, Preamble (2006, 6) (Spain).
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other than the Spanish Nation, the mention of which opens
its preamble, on which the Constitution is based (Article 2
CE) and with which it expressly qualifies the sovereignty
that, when exercised by the Spanish people as its sole
acknowledged holder (Article 1.2), has been manifested as
the wish to constitute the State in the positive provisions of
the Spanish Constitution . . . .
Under no circumstances can any nationality be claimed
other than the one specified in the Constitution proclaimed
by the will of that Nation, nor through an ambiguity that is
completely irrelevant in the judicial/constitutional context,
the only guide that this Court can follow, by referring the
term 'nation' to any other subject that is not the people
holding that sovereignty7 1
The government of Spain contends that it would be
constitutionally impossible for Catalonia to separate from the
Kingdom of Spain. In addition to Article 2 of the Constitution, it
relies on Articles 8 and 92.2o
Catalans who argue for separation maintain that the
Constitution of 1978 cannot be set up against Article 1.1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which was
ratified by Spain in 1977: "All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development."2 1
Some Catalans also argue that Article 95 of the Constitution
provides a 'toe in the door'.2
19. S.T.C.,June 28, 2010 (S.T.C., No. 31, § II [ 12) (Spain).
20. C I., B.O.E. art. 2, 8(1) Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). (providing "The mission of the
Arimed Forces, comprising the Army the Navy and the Air Force, is to guarantee the
sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the
constitutional order"); C.E., B.O.E. art. 92 (1-2), Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (Article 92(1)
providing "Political decisions of special importance may be submitted to all Citizens in a
consultative referendum[,]" Article 92(2) providing "The referendum shall be called
by the King on the President of the Government's proposal after previous
authorization by the Congress[]" and Article 92(3) providing "An organic act shall iay
down the terms and procedures for the different kinds of referendum provided for in
this Constitution.").
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 19. 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 14668.
22. C.E.. B.O.E. art. 95, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (providing. < 1. The conclusion of
an international treaty containing stipulations contrary to the Constitution shall
require prior constitutional amendment. 2. The Government or either House may
2013] 1159
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On 23 January 2013, the Parliament of Catalonia passed, by
a two-thirds majority, a Declaration of Sovereignty and of the
Right to Decide of the People of Catalonia.23 This sets out a
number of principles, of which the first is "The people of
Catalonia, for reasons of democratic legitimacy, has the
character of a sovereign political and juridical subject [of law]".
The Spanish government, following an opinion of the Council
of State (Consejo de Estado),24 has contested the constitutionality
of the Declaration before the Constitutional Court which has
provisionally suspended its validity and application. Judge
Santiago Vidal of the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona has cited
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Kosovo Case,N as supporting the lawfulness of the Declaration.27
For present purposes, it would be safer to assume that a
unilateral declaration of independence by Catalonia would be
declared unconstitutional. In that event, it is not clear by what
mechanism, even after a vote in favour of separation in
Catalonia, separation could be negotiated at the national level,
nor how or when Catalonia could achieve international
recognition as a sovereign State.
IV. AALYSIS
At least three quite different scenarios can therefore be
envisaged for purposes of discussion.
In two cases (Scotland and Flanders) we can assume that
separation would be accepted as constitutionally admissible
under national law. In the other case (Catalonia) separation
request the Constitutional Court to declare whether or not such a contradiction
exists.").
23. For the original text, see http://ww.parlamc nt. cat/wch /actualitat/
noticics?p-id=129656021, and for a translation, sec http://WA.vilawveb.cat/noticia/
4076896/20130124/dcclaration-of-sovereignty-and-of-the-right-to-decide-of-the-catalan-
nation.htrl.
24. For the text of thc advice and dissenting opinion, see http://www.aclpa.org/
actualidad/201303/(oinscjo( atalun ya.pdf
25. http:,// wy.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/05/10/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-4859.pdf.
26. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo. Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 11 79,84 (JIuly
22).
27. See Report of Interview with Judge Santiago Vidal and video link at
http://'wmydiriCLc.cat/[noticia/276141/cl-jutge-saltiago-vidal-iosra-la-clau-de-Iolta-
de-la-independencia-de-catalunya.
SEPARATION OF MEMBER STATES
would be contested, not simply as unconstitutional but as
constitutionally impossible.
The cases of Scotland and Flanders can then be
distinguished from each other as far as public international law
is concerned. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to identify
Flanders or Wallonia as the successor State. In that event, on the
analogy of Czechoslovakia, Flanders and Wallonia would each
succeed to the international rights and obligations of Belgium.
On the other hand, in the case of the United Kingdom, it is
argued with some degree of plausibility that RoUK would be
recognised as the successor State and Scotland as a 'new' State.
In that event, RoUK would succeed to all the international rights
and obligations of the former United Kingdom. Scotland would
not do so but would correspondingly be able to choose the
treaty obligations by which it would continue to be bound.
It should, however, be kept in mind that there is no
doctrine of public international law that requires either result.
The treatment of 'separating States' is to be deduced from State
practice, which is not wholly uniform and may, in contemporary
conditions, depend as much on political as on legal
considerations.
Against that background, we can consider how EU law
would treat each of these cases.
It can be seen at once that the Barroso theory cannot
provide a sufficient answer. It is suggested that "If part of the
territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state
because it were to become a new independent state, the Treaties
would no longer apply to that territory."28 Plainly that could not
apply if Flanders and Wallonia were to become separate States
and the Kingdom of Belgium ceased to exist. The same would
arguably be true if the true effect of separation of Scotland and
England were held to be that the United Kingdom ceased to
exist.
The first question to consider is therefore whether and to
what extent EU law, as opposed to conventional public
international law, provides a legal solution.
28. Barroso Letter, supra note 6.
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A. The Scope ofApplication ofEU Law
In its judgment in Van Gend en Loos, 9 the Court of Justice
declared:
To ascertain whether the provisions of an international
Treaty extend so far in their effects, it is necessary to
consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of
those provisions . . . .
The community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,
and the subjects of which comprise not only member states
but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of
member states, Community law therefore not only imposes
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted
by the treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the
treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as
well as upon the member states and upon the institutions of
the community.
Thus, while the EU is certainly a creature of public
international law, the Treaties create a "new legal order" of
international law" which differs from conventional international
law in that its subjects are not only the Member States, but also
their nationals (now also citizens). The autonomy of the EU
legal order has repeatedly been affirmed by the Court of
Justice.30
The relationship between a Member State, the EU
institutions and the other Member States is governed by the
Treaties. The solution to any problem for which the Treaties do
not expressly provide must be sought first within the system of
the Treaties, including their spirit and general scheme. Only if
the Treaties can provide no answer may one resort to
conventional public international law (including doctrines of
state succession).
29. NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenuc Administration. Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, I I1(B).
30. See Kadi v. Council of the European Union, Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-
415/05P, [2008], E.C.R. 1225, [ 2J-91
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The EU Treaties, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon-the
TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
('TFEU')-contain no provision dealing with the case of
separation of a Member State. So we must look to the spirit and
general scheme of the Treaties. A few citations will suffice.
Article 2 TEU (already cited in part) provides (emphasis
added):
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality
between women and men prevail.31
Article 4 TEU provides (emphasis added):
2. The nion shall respect the equality of Member States
before the Treaties as well as their national identities,
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State functions,
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State,
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national
security. In particular. national security remains the sole
responsibility of each Member State.
3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect,
assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the
Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure,
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the
institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of
the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.32
Article 20 TFEU establishes citizenship of the Union:
31. TEU, supra note 7, art. 2.
32. TEU, supra note 7, art. 4.
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1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a
citizen of the Union ....
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be
subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall
have, inter alia:
(a) the right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States ....
Article 50 TEU provides for the case of a Member State's
withdrawal from the EU (a situation for which the Treaties did
not previously provide):
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall
notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of
the guidelines provided by the European Council, the
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that
State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking
account of the framework for its future relationship with the
Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance
with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the
Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal
agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification
referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council. in
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously
decides to extend this period."
The reason why Article 50 requires a period of negotiation
is that withdrawal from the Union would involve the unraveling
of a highly complex skein of budgetary, legal, political, financial,
commercial and personal relationships, liabilities and
obligations. These relationships, liabilities and obligations are
multilateral and, in general, reciprocal. The nationals of the
withdrawing Member State have acquired rights of citizenship
33. TEU, supra note 7, art. 50.
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and free movement of goods, persons, services and capital vis-A-
vis the rest of the EU. But so too have the nationals of other
Member States vis-A-vis the withdrawing State, its territory, its
institutions and its people. They include (to take only four out
of hundreds of possible examples) investors in the corporate
sector, Erasmus and other students, migrant workers, and
fishermen operating in the waters of other Member States.
In order to overcome these difficulties in the event of
withdrawal, the Treaties provide for an extended period of
negotiation. Would the same apply to the less drastic situation
where an existing Member State separates into two parts and
both wish to continue membership? Or must we despair of
finding the solution in the spirit and scheme of the Treaties and
resort to conventional public international law as the Barroso
theory suggests?
B. Application of EU law to the case of separation
It is useful to begin by considering the legal and practical
implications of the 'Barroso theory'.
First, at the level of principle, the theory seems to assume
that, contrary to the principles asserted in Articles 2 and 4 TEU
(as well as the Preamble of the Treaty), EU law does not
recognise the democratic right of the inhabitants of one part of
a Member State to dissolve their constitutional union with those
of the other part(s) other than at the cost of automatic loss of
their acquired rights as citizens of the EU.
Second, it seems to be assumed that-at the moment of
separation or on some other unspecified date-the 'separating
State', its citizens and its land and sea area would find
themselves in some form of legal limbo vis-4-vis the rest of the
EU and its citizens, unless and until a new Accession Treaty were
negotiated. Until the moment of separation, they would remain
an integral part of the EU; all EU citizens living in the
separating State would enjoy all the rights of citizenship and free
movement; and the same would apply, correspondingly, to all
other EU citizens and companies in their relations with that
State. Then, at the midnight hour, all these relationships would
come abruptly to an end.
2013] 1165
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The logical consequence in law would be that the acquis
communautaire would no longer, as such, be part of the law of the
separating State, which would cease, for example, to be
constrained by the Treaty rules in relation to the rates of VAT
and corporation tax. Erasmus students studying there would
become 'foreign students' without rights. Migrant workers
would lose their rights to social security. And the whole land and
sea territory of the separating State would cease to be within the
jurisdiction of the EU-in the case of Scotland which probably
has the largest sea area in the EU, an important security
consideration quite apart from other considerations.
In addition, if the Barroso theory is correct, the same must
apply in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights
and other international instruments for the protection of
human rights, to which the United Kingdom and other Member
States of the EU are parties.
Third-apparently-there would be no legal obligation
upon the 'successor State', the EU institutions or the other
Member States to enter into any negotiations before separation
took effect in order to avoid such a remarkable, and potentially
uncontrollable, situation coming to pass.
On closer examination, it can be seen that the Barroso
theory is workable only in a situation, like Scotland and RoUK,
where one entity is significantly larger than the other, and it can
plausibly be said that one of them is the successor State and the
other the seceding or separating State. In the case of Flanders
and Wallonia (assuming the extinction of the Kingdom of
Belgium), the logic of the Barroso theory suggests that both
must be classified as 'new' States, so that the political institutions
of the EU (including Mr Barroso's own office) would find
themselves in a 'third country'!
It might be suggested that this would produce such absurd
and unacceptable results that the EU would accept both
Flanders and Wallonia as successor States which would then be
entitled automatically to the status of Member States in their
own right. The case of Scotland and RoUK would, by contrast,
be treated according to the Barroso theory. That might be a
political solution, but hardly adequate as a legal one, nor for
that matter consistent with the principle of non-discrimination.
SEPARATION OF MEMBER STATES
Moreover, such a solution would ignore the necessity to
settle matters such as the number of members of the European
Parliament and the contribution to the EU budget to mention
only two. On these and other issues, there would be scope for
substantial disagreement, not only between Flanders and
Wallonia, but also between them and the other Member States.
In short, even in that case, pre-separation negotiation would be
essential.
Looking to the presumed intention of the Treaty-makers,
they cannot reasonably be supposed to have intended that there
must be prior negotiation in the case of withdrawal but none in
the case of separation. They cannot have intended the
paradoxical legal consequences of automatic exclusion
suggested by the Barroso theory nor, at a more practical level,
that the complex skein of relationships, liabilities and
obligations created by EU law should be allowed to unravel
without measures being taken to prevent it.
In order to avoid the disruption that would otherwise
ensue, negotiation would be necessary before separation took
place-precisely as the Treaty requires in the case of withdrawal.
The purpose of pre-separation negotiation would be to
agree the necessary amendments to the existing Treaties to
accommodate the new situation and not, as the Barroso theory
suggests, one or more Accession Treaties. It may be objected
that such negotiations might fail and that Treaty amendment
would in any event require ratification by the Member States.
However, the fact that the outcome of negotiations cannot
be predicted does not alter the obligation of all parties, including
the Member State in the process of separation, to negotiate in good
faith in accordance with principles of sincere cooperation, full
mutual respect and solidarity. Maintaining the territorial and
political integrity of the EU and the vested rights of its citizens is
surely of greater importance than blind acceptance of the
contestable doctrines of public international law.
That is as far as the Treaties can take us, but it is at least a
solution more rational and consistent with the spirit of the
Treaties than the Barroso theory. It does not resolve the case of
Catalonia since, as noted above, it is to be assumed that Spain
would regard the separation of Catalonia as constitutionally
impossible. Even in that case, however, it is difficult to see how
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an acceptable solution could be found without negotiation in
which the EU might reasonably claim to have a part to play.
Lastly, the three cases discussed all involve Member States
in Western Europe. Winston Churchill observed that the
Balkans produce more history than they can consume.34 As the
EU enlarges to embrace more countries in Middle and Eastern
Europe, it cannot be excluded that further separations may
occur. There should be at least the beginnings of a rational legal
understanding of their consequences.
34. Margaret MacMillan, PLACELAKERS: THL PARIS PEACL CONFLRLNCL OF 1919
AND ITS AT TEMPT TO END WAR, 122 (2001).
